# Iran Warns It Will Target Regional Oil If Its Exports Hit *Sunday, May 17, 2026 at 2:04 PM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk* **Published**: 2026-05-17T14:04:38.601Z (4h ago) **Category**: geopolitics | **Region**: Middle East **Importance**: 7/10 **Sources**: OSINT **Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/4303.md **Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries --- **Deck**: On 17 May 2026, Iran’s deputy parliamentary speaker Hamid Reza Hajibabaei threatened that attacks on Iranian oil would trigger retaliatory strikes on energy infrastructure across the region. The warning comes amid heightened tensions and concerns over potential renewed U.S. military action. ## Key Takeaways - On 17 May 2026, senior Iranian lawmaker Hamid Reza Hajibabaei warned that if Iran’s oil exports are harmed, Tehran will target regional oil infrastructure, affecting both "friends" and "enemies". - He said that under such conditions the world could be denied oil from the region for a prolonged period, explicitly linking energy security to deterrence. - The statement aligns with assessments that Iran expects possible renewed U.S. military strikes and is adopting a strategy of "strategic ambiguity" and time‑buying. - The threat underscores the vulnerability of Gulf energy infrastructure and sea lanes at a time of already strained global markets. - Regional states now face elevated risk of being drawn into escalation even if they seek to remain neutral. On 17 May 2026, at approximately 11:48 UTC, Hamid Reza Hajibabaei, deputy speaker of Iran’s parliament, issued a strongly worded warning regarding potential attacks on Iranian energy infrastructure. He stated that if any decision is made to harm Iran’s oil, "the oil of the countries in the region will also be attacked, whether these are countries that claim to be our friends or our enemies." He added that in such a scenario, the entire world could be deprived of oil from the region for a long period and that any offensive against Iran’s energy sector would prompt wide‑ranging retaliation. His remarks came amid reports, around 14:00 UTC, that regional intelligence officials believe Tehran is seeking to buy time in anticipation of possible renewed U.S. military action under President Donald Trump. Those officials characterized Iran’s approach as a strategy of "strategic ambiguity"—attempting to avoid steps that would trigger an immediate strike while signaling that escalation would be met with broad regional disruption. ### Background & Context Iran has long used threats to disrupt regional energy flows as part of its deterrence toolkit. During previous crises, Tehran hinted at or attempted interference with shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, targeted tankers, and allowed proxies to strike oil facilities in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The current environment is marked by elevated tensions following Israeli and U.S. operations against Iranian assets, including covert and overt strikes on missile, nuclear, and proxy infrastructure. Simultaneously, attacks on energy infrastructure—such as the 17 May drone strike near the Barakah nuclear facility in the UAE—underscore the vulnerability of regional energy systems to unmanned threats. Iran’s leadership likely views the threat to regional oil as a means of deterring direct attacks on its own exports and infrastructure, while reminding Gulf monarchies and global consumers of the potential costs of confrontation. ### Key Players Involved Domestically, Hajibabaei’s statement reflects positions held within Iran’s conservative political and security establishment, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and elements of the Supreme National Security Council. Their shared objective is to deter U.S. and Israeli strikes by raising the prospective cost in global economic and energy terms. Externally, key stakeholders include: - **Gulf oil producers** (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar), whose upstream and midstream infrastructure would be at risk in any Iranian retaliation. - **The United States**, which maintains military assets across the region and whose forces would likely be involved in protecting energy routes and responding to attacks. - **Global energy consumers**, particularly in Asia and Europe, who depend on steady supplies from the Gulf and are sensitive to price shocks. ### Why It Matters Hajibabaei’s threat is not entirely new in substance but is significant in timing and explicitness. By stating that both friends and enemies could be targeted, he signals that even states maintaining dialogue with Tehran are not insulated if Iran perceives them as facilitating attacks on its oil sector. Operationally, Iran and its network of proxies possess multiple tools to make good on such threats: naval mines, fast boats, anti‑ship missiles, drones, and cruise missiles capable of striking ports, pipelines, refineries, and offshore facilities. Past incidents—such as attacks on Saudi oil processing plants and tankers in the Gulf—demonstrate both capability and willingness. The global oil market is already under pressure from supply disruptions and geopolitical uncertainty. A serious attack on regional energy infrastructure could drive prices sharply higher, feed inflationary pressures worldwide, and destabilize fragile economies. Even the perception of heightened risk may prompt shipping insurers to raise premiums or reroute traffic, increasing costs. ### Regional and Global Implications Regionally, Hajibabaei’s warning will intensify threat assessments in Gulf capitals. States hosting U.S. forces or cooperating closely with Washington may be ranked by Tehran as higher‑priority targets. This could incentivize them to enhance missile and drone defenses, disperse critical infrastructure, and consider de‑escalatory diplomatic channels with Iran. For the United States, the statements add urgency to contingency planning for defense of energy infrastructure and sea lanes, as well as to any decisions about renewed strikes on Iranian assets. Washington must balance coercive measures against the risk of triggering a broader energy shock that could damage the global economy and U.S. domestic interests. Globally, energy importers—especially in Asia and Europe—face elevated exposure. They may seek to diversify supplies, increase strategic stockpiles, and encourage diplomatic initiatives aimed at reducing the likelihood of a Gulf energy confrontation. ## Outlook & Way Forward In the near term, Iran is likely to continue calibrating its posture to avoid crossing clear U.S. red lines while maintaining a posture of credible menace toward regional energy routes. Expect stepped‑up proxy activity, cyber probing of energy companies, and rhetorical escalations designed to keep adversaries uncertain about Tehran’s thresholds. Gulf states and Western partners will respond through heightened maritime patrols, integrated air and missile defense efforts, and quiet diplomacy aimed at establishing off‑ramps. The 17 May drone incident near the Barakah plant may catalyze additional security investments and coordination. Strategically, whether Hajibabaei’s threat becomes operational depends on decisions in Washington and Tel Aviv as much as in Tehran. Should renewed U.S. strikes materialize, Iran could feel compelled to follow through to preserve deterrent credibility. Key indicators to monitor include unusual deployments of Iranian naval assets, increased proxy missile and drone stockpiles near Gulf chokepoints, shifts in tanker traffic patterns, and direct or indirect contacts between Iran and Gulf capitals. The balance between deterrence and escalation miscalculation will remain fragile in the months ahead.