# US, China Align Against Transit Tolls in Strait of Hormuz *Wednesday, May 13, 2026 at 2:03 AM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk* **Published**: 2026-05-13T02:03:16.346Z (2h ago) **Category**: geopolitics | **Region**: Middle East **Importance**: 7/10 **Sources**: OSINT **Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/3689.md **Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries --- **Deck**: The United States and China have reportedly agreed not to support transit tolls in the Strait of Hormuz, with the understanding emerging around 00:47 UTC on 13 May 2026. The alignment comes amid evolving Iranian efforts to control access to the critical maritime chokepoint. ## Key Takeaways - Around 00:47 UTC on 13 May 2026, reports indicated the U.S. and China agreed not to allow transit tolls in the Strait of Hormuz. - The rare alignment underscores shared interests in keeping a key energy artery free of new cost and control mechanisms. - The understanding comes as Iran seeks greater gatekeeping authority over Hormuz traffic through bilateral arrangements. - The stance may shape future negotiations with Gulf producers and Iran over maritime governance and security. The United States and China have reportedly reached an understanding not to support the imposition of transit tolls in the Strait of Hormuz, with details surfacing at approximately 00:47 UTC on 13 May 2026. The move represents a notable confluence of interests between the world’s two largest economies, both heavily invested in the uninterrupted and cost-efficient flow of energy through the narrow waterway. The Strait of Hormuz is the conduit for a substantial share of global seaborne oil and liquefied natural gas exports, connecting Gulf producers to consumers in Asia, Europe, and North America. Any attempt to levy transit fees or establish new financial barriers to passage would have immediate implications for energy prices, shipping costs, and the broader global economy. The reported U.S.-China understanding must be viewed against a backdrop of mounting Iranian efforts to exert de facto control over maritime traffic, including newly reported bilateral deals with Iraq and Pakistan to guarantee safe passage for specific cargoes. While those arrangements appear to focus on security assurances and route approvals, they raise the prospect that Tehran could seek to monetize or formalize its gatekeeping role through some form of fees or conditional permissions. Washington and Beijing share different strategic concerns but converge on the principle of maintaining freedom of navigation and predictable trade flows in Hormuz. For the United States, opposing tolls aligns with long-standing commitments to open sea lanes and with the interests of Gulf partners wary of additional Iranian leverage. For China, the world’s largest crude importer, additional transit costs or politicized access restrictions would undercut energy security and economic planning. The understanding does not, by itself, neutralize Iran’s geographic and military leverage over the strait. However, it signals that any unilateral attempt by Tehran or other regional actors to impose tolls would likely face coordinated diplomatic and possibly economic resistance from both major powers. It also creates a basis for Washington and Beijing to work, at least tacitly, with European and Asian importers on maintaining existing freedom-of-navigation norms. Key stakeholders include Gulf oil and gas producers, whose export competitiveness could be eroded by added transit fees; European and Asian consumer states whose energy bills would increase; and global shipping and insurance industries that would have to adjust pricing models if tolls or similar mechanisms were introduced. The alignment on this specific issue stands in contrast to broader U.S.-China strategic rivalry but illustrates that practical cooperation is still possible where core economic interests overlap. It may also serve as a template for limited coordination on other maritime security challenges where both sides rely on shared infrastructure, such as key straits in Southeast Asia. ## Outlook & Way Forward In the near term, observers should watch for official statements from Washington and Beijing clarifying the scope and nature of their understanding. Explicit public opposition to any toll regime in Hormuz from both capitals would increase the political cost for Iran or other regional actors contemplating such measures. Silence or ambiguity could, conversely, leave room for incremental moves that skirt overt tolls but introduce other quasi-fee mechanisms. Over the medium term, this convergence could prompt discussions—formal or informal—on broader norms governing economically critical straits. Such conversations might involve not only the U.S. and China but also Gulf states, European Union members, Japan, India, and South Korea. A shared position against new transit charges could be incorporated into multilateral forums addressing maritime law, energy security, and crisis management in the Gulf. Strategically, the U.S.-China stance complicates Tehran’s calculus as it moves toward a more controlled-access model for Hormuz. While Iran can still negotiate bespoke arrangements with neighbors, any attempt to turn access into a significant revenue stream via tolls is likely to face stiff resistance from the largest customers of Gulf energy. Analysts should monitor whether Iran shifts instead toward more subtle instruments of leverage—such as inspection regimes, security “services,” or prioritized routing—which could function as de facto tolls without the name. How Washington and Beijing respond to such subtler measures will determine whether this alignment meaningfully constrains Iran’s long-term gatekeeping ambitions.