# Venezuela Ships Out Last Highly Enriched Uranium From Old Reactor *Sunday, May 10, 2026 at 6:10 AM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk* **Published**: 2026-05-10T06:10:06.449Z (4h ago) **Category**: geopolitics | **Region**: Latin America **Importance**: 7/10 **Sources**: OSINT **Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/3319.md **Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries --- **Deck**: In late April, approximately 13.5 kg of highly enriched uranium was removed from an aging research reactor site near Caracas and transported out of Venezuela. The operation, reported at 06:02 UTC on 10 May, involved cooperation between Venezuelan authorities, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the IAEA. ## Key Takeaways - Around 13.5 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) was removed from Venezuela in late April 2026. - The material came from the decommissioned RV‑1 research reactor near Caracas and was transported by land and sea. - The operation involved coordination between Venezuela, the US, the UK, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. - This marks a major step in eliminating Venezuela’s nuclear legacy and reducing proliferation risks in the region. - The cooperative nature of the mission provides a rare example of pragmatic engagement among politically estranged actors. At 06:02 UTC on 10 May 2026, details emerged of a significant nuclear security operation conducted in Venezuela in late April. According to the information, approximately 13.5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) were removed from the country, marking the effective end of Venezuela’s legacy holdings of weapons‑usable nuclear material. The HEU originated from the RV‑1 research reactor, an aging facility located near Caracas that has long been out of regular operation. Over recent years, concerns have persisted among nuclear security experts about the potential vulnerability of such legacy materials to theft, diversion, or degradation due to limited resources for secure storage and oversight. The removal operation was described as a coordinated effort involving Venezuelan authorities, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The material was reportedly transported by land from the reactor site to a port facility and then shipped by sea to an undisclosed destination, consistent with standard practice in sensitive nuclear fuel repatriation or disposition operations. Key players in this development include Venezuela’s nuclear regulatory and security authorities, international technical teams from the US and UK with experience in HEU removal, and the IAEA, which typically provides verification, technical assistance, and assurance that operations comply with global non‑proliferation norms. The precise roles and sequencing of the operation have not been publicly detailed but likely involved tight security protocols and real‑time coordination among multiple agencies. This operation is significant on several levels. From a nuclear security standpoint, the extraction of 13.5 kg of HEU—enough, in principle, to contribute to one or more improvised nuclear devices if diverted—represents a substantial risk reduction. Legacy research reactor fuel has historically been a weak point in the global nuclear security architecture; removing such material eliminates a potential target for non‑state actors. From a geopolitical angle, the joint involvement of the US, UK, Venezuela, and the IAEA stands out. Relations between Caracas and Western governments have been tense, characterized by sanctions, political disputes, and mutual distrust. Successful completion of a complex, high‑stakes technical mission indicates that pragmatic cooperation on narrowly defined security objectives remains possible, even amid broader political contention. In the Latin American and Caribbean region—governed by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established a nuclear‑weapon‑free zone—this step reinforces long‑standing norms against nuclear weapons and weapons‑usable materials. It also reduces the risk that economic deterioration or political instability in Venezuela could intersect with weak physical protection of nuclear materials. Globally, the operation aligns with ongoing efforts to minimize and eventually eliminate civilian use of HEU, a core objective of international nuclear security summits and related initiatives over the past two decades. Each successful removal operation strengthens precedent for similar missions in other states with aging research reactors or small HEU stocks. ## Outlook & Way Forward In the near term, attention will focus on confirming the final disposition of the removed HEU and the status of the RV‑1 site. It is likely that the material is being returned to a supplier state or transferred to a secure facility for down‑blending into low‑enriched uranium (LEU) or long‑term storage. The IAEA will play a continuing role in verification and oversight, ensuring that the operation meets non‑proliferation standards. Over the medium term, this operation may open a narrow window for further technical cooperation between Venezuela and international partners on nuclear safety, radiological security, and environmental remediation related to the decommissioned reactor. Such engagement could remain insulated from broader political issues, serving as a confidence‑building measure while delivering tangible security benefits. More broadly, this case will be watched by other states with legacy research reactor programs and modest HEU inventories. Successful completion without major incident could incentivize similar removals, especially where security concerns intersect with financial or technical constraints on safely maintaining old facilities. Analysts should monitor for follow‑on announcements of HEU repatriation elsewhere, as well as any moves to update regional nuclear security frameworks building on Venezuela’s elimination of its weapons‑usable nuclear legacy.