# Poll: Russian public blames U.S. and NATO, not Kremlin, for war destruction in Ukraine

*Sunday, November 22, 2026 at 2:05 AM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Published**: 2026-11-22T02:05:51.366Z (55m ago)
**Category**: intelligence | **Region**: Eastern Europe
**Importance**: 7/10
**Sources**: https://t.me/TheLeaflet/25371 | https://t.me/worldnews/79272 | https://t.me/pichinchauniversal/140083 | https://t.me/pichinchauniversal/140082 | https://t.me/UNoticias/184258
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/24148.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Deck**: A new poll shows 65% of Russians hold the U.S. and NATO responsible for the deaths and devastation in Ukraine, while only 6% blame their own country. That perception gap sheds light on why the Kremlin has been able to sustain a costly war and what limits Moscow’s domestic pressure to change course.

Two years of bloodshed in Ukraine have not shaken a core narrative inside Russia about who is responsible. A recent poll reported on 22 November found that 65% of Russians blame the United States and NATO for the deaths and destruction in Ukraine, while only 6% point the finger at their own country. The numbers offer a stark look at how the Kremlin’s messaging has filtered into public opinion and how insulated Moscow remains from grassroots pressure to end the war.

The survey’s detailed methodology and sample size were not provided in the initial reporting, but the broad pattern is clear: a strong majority of respondents internalize the idea that Western powers, not the Kremlin, are chiefly at fault for the conflict’s human and material cost. With such a small share assigning primary blame to Russia, there is little sign of widespread acknowledgment at home of the role Russian forces have played in launching and sustaining full-scale hostilities.

For ordinary Russians, these perceptions shape what feels politically possible. If people believe the war was forced on their country by NATO expansion, U.S. interference, or Western aggression, then calls for compromise or withdrawal can sound like capitulation to an enemy rather than a pragmatic step to limit loss of life. That mindset narrows the space for anti-war voices, many of whom already face legal and social risks, and it undercuts arguments that continued fighting is eroding Russia’s own security and prosperity.

In Ukraine, the human consequences behind the statistics are visceral: cities shelled, infrastructure shattered, millions displaced. But the poll suggests that many people inside Russia do not connect that reality to decisions made in the Kremlin. Instead, the violence is framed as an inevitable clash with the West playing out on Ukrainian soil. That framing helps explain why, despite mobilization, casualties, and economic strain, there has been no mass movement with the scale or coherence needed to challenge Moscow’s war policy.

Strategically, the poll numbers matter because they inform how Russian leaders judge their domestic room for maneuver. A leadership that believes its population blames external actors for hardship can pursue a long conflict with more confidence that discontent will be directed outward, not at home. It also gives Moscow leverage in negotiations: officials can argue that conceding too much to the West would lack legitimacy with a public steeped in the narrative of Western culpability.

For Western governments and Ukraine’s partners, the data is a warning about the limits of information campaigns aimed at the Russian public. Sanctions, independent media in exile, and online outreach have all tried to puncture the Kremlin’s account of the war. A result in which barely one in ten Russians primarily blames their own government suggests that, for now, those efforts have been overwhelmed by state television, school curricula, and legal crackdowns on dissent.

The poll also reveals something about how sustainable sanctions pressure is. Populations who see foreign actors as the main villain behind wartime hardship may tolerate greater economic pain without turning against their government. That means Western policymakers holding out hope that public opinion in Russia will rapidly flip and force a policy change may need to recalibrate expectations.

Public blame does not stay on the page of a survey; it shapes what leaders dare to do and how long they think they can keep doing it. The next things to watch are whether forthcoming polls inside Russia show any shift in attitudes as the war drags on, how the Kremlin adjusts its propaganda to maintain the current balance of opinion, and whether economic or battlefield shocks can pierce a narrative that, so far, largely absolves Moscow of responsibility for a war it chose to fight.
