# Planned Trump–Putin–Xi Meeting Fuels Allied Fears of a New ‘G3’ Deal Over Ukraine and Taiwan

*Tuesday, November 17, 2026 at 2:10 PM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Published**: 2026-11-17T14:10:56.745Z (12h ago)
**Category**: geopolitics | **Region**: Global
**Importance**: 9/10
**Sources**: https://t.me/KurdishFrontNews/34074 | https://t.me/ourwarstoday/45934 | https://t.me/militarysummary/32971 | https://t.me/operativnoZSU/226361 | https://t.me/operativnoZSU/226360
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/23751.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Deck**: A planned trilateral meeting between Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and Xi Jinping alongside the APEC summit in Shenzhen is prompting concern in Europe and Asia that a new great‑power format could sideline existing allies and security commitments.

A proposed meeting between the leaders of the United States, Russia, and China in Shenzhen this week is already adding strain to alliance politics well beyond the Asia‑Pacific.

The Kremlin has announced that a meeting is scheduled for 19 November in China between Presidents Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Donald Trump, coinciding with the APEC summit in Shenzhen on 18–19 November. Russian presidential adviser Yuri Ushakov has described the encounter as one that will have a decisive impact on the development of the international situation.

Analysts quoted by Russian media suggest the same gathering could mark the emergence of a new power format. Alexander L. Vuving, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia‑Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, told Sputnik that a trilateral Putin‑Trump‑Xi session could open the door to a “G3” structure in which the three major players coordinate on key security and economic questions.

Reporting from European outlets says U.S. allies are on alert ahead of the summit. Governments in Europe worry that Trump might float unexpected positions on Ukraine or Taiwan that align with the preferences of Moscow or Beijing. Some fear signals from Shenzhen could include openness to freezing the war in Ukraine broadly along current lines or language that weakens support for Taiwan’s de facto autonomy.

For Ukraine, the stakes are severe. Its war effort depends on sustained Western backing and on the assumption that Washington will not abruptly change course on sanctions or military aid. The notion that the future of occupied territories, including Crimea and the Donbas, might be discussed in a format where Kyiv has no seat at the table feeds anxiety among Ukrainians already displaced or under fire.

In East Asia, Taiwan faces its own set of concerns. China has toughened its posture in the region, while Taiwan has just begun receiving long‑delayed F‑16 Block 70 fighter jets from the United States, with five aircraft delivered so far to a base near Taitung. Leaders in Taipei will be parsing any language that emerges from Shenzhen for signs of how U.S. assurances on Taiwan line up with Washington’s stated One China policy.

Trump’s recent public comments add uncertainty for allies. He has claimed that ongoing conflict is causing tens of thousands of Russian and Iranian deaths per month, citing figures that far exceed most open estimates, and has said he does not rule out a separate bilateral meeting with Putin in China. Those remarks reinforce perceptions in allied capitals that Trump sees himself as a unique deal‑maker with adversaries, which raises questions about what he might be willing to offer or concede in private.

For Beijing, hosting a trilateral session allows China to underscore its status as a central convening power. For Moscow, which is under sanctions and fighting a grinding war, simply appearing as one of three central actors alongside Washington and Beijing helps counter its isolation narrative.

Allied governments will judge the Shenzhen meeting less by ceremony than by specifics. They will examine any joint or parallel statements on Ukraine’s borders, sanctions, and military support, or on Taiwan, South China Sea navigation, and U.S. basing. Just as important will be what Trump communicates afterwards to NATO, the European Union, and Indo‑Pacific partners about any understandings reached, formal or informal.
