# Bab al-Mandeb setback for Yemen government widens Red Sea chokepoint risk

*Sunday, November 15, 2026 at 10:07 PM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Published**: 2026-11-15T22:07:10.877Z (42m ago)
**Category**: conflict | **Region**: Middle East
**Importance**: 8/10
**Sources**: https://t.me/operativnoZSU/226210 | https://t.me/operativnoZSU/226209 | https://t.me/operativnoZSU/226208 | https://t.me/operativnoZSU/226207 | https://t.me/operativnoZSU/226206
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/23585.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Deck**: Yemeni government forces have pulled back from areas near the Bab al-Mandeb strait after a six-week counteroffensive failed, while Houthi-aligned units claim control over new positions along the coast. The change of ground control at the Red Sea’s southern gateway raises fresh questions for shipping companies, insurers and regional navies.

Control of land overlooking the Bab al-Mandeb strait is shifting again, this time in favour of forces aligned with Yemen’s Houthi movement and against Saudi-backed government units that had tried for six weeks to regain the initiative along the Red Sea coast.

On Sunday, government forces acknowledged they were withdrawing from an area near the Bab al-Mandeb to concentrate on defending their main base in Aden. The retreat followed an extended counteroffensive aimed at restoring control over key stretches of the Red Sea shoreline, a campaign that has now been described as a serious setback for loyalist units. The operation had sought to reassert authority over terrain that matters not only to Yemen’s internal war but to global shipping lanes.

Field reporting from Sanaa-aligned sources went further, asserting that Aden-aligned forces had completely withdrawn from most of the Madaribah and al-Arah districts. Those reports said Ansarallah forces had taken full control of Al-Hijaf, Al-Adadiyah, Ras al-Arah, Khor Amira and the rest of Jabal Kharaz. With these gains, the Sanaa government now controls nearly 30% of a critical belt of territory near the Bab al-Mandeb, according to the same accounts. The precise percentages are hard to verify independently, but the direction of change — away from the internationally recognized government and toward Houthi-aligned authorities — is clear.

For Yemenis living in these districts, the change of control can mean a new set of checkpoints, commanders and security rules, with direct effects on trade, fishing and aid access. Civilians caught between withdrawing and advancing forces risk displacement or being cut off from markets and services if front lines harden along new lines.

For shipping operators, the implications are more abstract but no less real. Bab al-Mandeb is the southern gateway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, a route that carries containerized goods, oil and liquefied natural gas between Europe, Asia and the Gulf. Armed groups holding ground near the coast do not need to physically block the strait to influence maritime calculations; the mere ability to harass traffic with drones, missiles or small boats can drive up insurance costs or push vessels to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope.

Regionally, the setback adds to concerns in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi about the durability of their preferred partners in southern Yemen. A more entrenched Houthi presence near Bab al-Mandeb could give Iran’s allies another lever over Red Sea security, at a time when missile and drone attacks tied to the Yemeni conflict are already affecting Saudi infrastructure farther inland.

The broader pattern is one of fragmented authority along one of the world’s vital chokepoints: a patchwork of forces with shifting alliances sits alongside a sea lane that global trade treats as a single corridor. When one side gains a cluster of hills or villages, it can alter the risk calculations of shipowners thousands of kilometres away.

The key insight is that maritime chokepoints are not secured only by warships and patrol boats; who holds the ridgelines and coastal roads ashore can quietly redraw the risk map for global trade.

In the coming days, attention will focus on whether government forces attempt a counter-counteroffensive, whether regional backers surge air or naval assets to the area, and whether insurers adjust premiums for ships transiting Bab al-Mandeb. Any confirmed use of shore-based missiles or drones from these newly captured positions, or visible diversion of commercial traffic, would signal that the shift on land is beginning to bite at sea.