# Ecuador interior minister alleges cross-border plot from Colombia to kill President Noboa

*Saturday, November 14, 2026 at 6:15 AM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Published**: 2026-11-14T06:15:22.661Z (39m ago)
**Category**: intelligence | **Region**: Latin America
**Importance**: 7/10
**Sources**: https://t.me/ClashReport/106077 | https://t.me/KurdishFrontNews/34027 | https://t.me/KurdishFrontNews/34026 | https://t.me/operativnoZSU/226096 | https://t.me/operativnoZSU/226095
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/23429.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Deck**: Ecuador’s interior minister John Reimberg says authorities uncovered a supposed plan to assassinate President Daniel Noboa, allegedly organized from Colombia and involving a criminal figure known as ‘Loco Ovidio’, according to local outlet Primicias.

Ecuador’s struggle with organized crime has taken a new turn with a claim from the country’s top internal security official that President Daniel Noboa is the target of an assassination plot allegedly directed from Colombia.

Interior minister John Reimberg told local media that authorities had identified a supposed plan to attack Noboa, linking it to a figure known as “Loco Ovidio” and to networks operating from Colombian territory. The report, carried by Ecuadorian outlet Primicias on 14 November, did not provide operational details but presented the threat as serious enough to disclose publicly.

The allegation has not been independently confirmed, and Colombian authorities have not yet commented on the specific claim. Even so, a sitting minister speaking about a plot to kill the president raises the stakes in a country that has resorted to repeated internal emergencies to respond to drug-linked violence.

For Ecuadorians, the news lands amid a wider sense that the boundary between politics and organized crime has eroded. Gang killings, prison massacres and attacks on media figures have become frequent. If criminal actors now see the presidency itself as a viable target, that reinforces fears that no public institution is beyond reach.

For security services, such a threat demands immediate changes around the president: tighter protection, revised travel routes, restrictions on public events, and urgent work by intelligence units to check the information and trace any network behind it. They must distinguish between rumor and actionable danger in an environment where gangs have both motive and capacity to strike high-profile figures, particularly one who has built his profile around tough anti-crime policies.

The alleged role of figures based in Colombia underlines the regional character of the challenge. Smuggling routes, laundering operations and gang alliances cross borders and respond to weak spots in state control. If people in Colombia are coordinating or sheltering those who aim to attack Noboa, it would test security cooperation between the two governments and could trigger calls in Quito for deeper joint operations or diplomatic pressure.

Politically, the interior minister’s statement gives the Noboa administration further grounds to argue for strong security measures and expanded powers. It may draw some public sympathy toward a president described as under direct threat, but it also invites questions about the evidence behind the allegation, how widely it has been vetted within the state, and how it fits with past warnings about criminal influence over institutions.

The main indicators to watch now are whether authorities announce arrests or seizures linked to the alleged plot, how Colombia responds, and whether Noboa’s public schedule and security posture change in visible ways. Any move toward new emergency decrees, security legislation or prominent joint actions with foreign partners will show how the government intends to translate this claim into policy.