# SilentAir Espionage Campaign Shows How Easily Hackers Can Hijack SMS Security in Asia

*Friday, November 13, 2026 at 12:08 PM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Published**: 2026-11-13T12:08:36.523Z (53m ago)
**Category**: cyber | **Region**: Asia-Pacific
**Importance**: 8/10
**Sources**: https://t.me/ClashReport/105917 | https://t.me/militarysummary/32841 | https://t.me/operativnoZSU/226058 | https://t.me/operativnoZSU/226057 | https://t.me/operativnoZSU/226056
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/23356.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Deck**: A newly identified espionage group, SilentAir, compromised telecom equipment in at least six Asian countries and intercepted SMS messages, including two-factor authentication codes, with users in Taiwan especially targeted.

An espionage group dubbed SilentAir has turned core mobile networks into a surveillance tool, exposing how fragile SMS security can be when attackers sit inside the infrastructure itself.

Researchers say SilentAir compromised telecom equipment in at least six Asian countries. From there, the group intercepted SMS traffic, including one-time codes used for two-factor authentication (2FA). According to the reporting, users in Taiwan were a primary focus.

Because the attackers gained access to systems inside the operators’ networks, they didn’t need to trick individual subscribers with fake links or apps. They could read text messages in transit, including login codes, password reset messages and ordinary personal texts.

For victims, that means accounts protected with SMS-based 2FA can be opened from within the network. If SilentAir can see the code a bank, email provider or social service sends by text, it can often use that code to log in as the account holder, even when the main password is strong.

For telecom engineers, the case underlines that core switches, routers and signaling systems are now high-value espionage targets. Once compromised, they offer visibility into traffic for millions of users and can affect several countries at once through roaming and shared infrastructure.

The focus on Taiwan also signals the strategic value of these intrusions. Taiwan sits at the center of multiple political and economic rivalries, so persistent access to its communications gives any state-backed sponsor a rich stream of political, military and corporate information.

The operation lands amid wider debates over how to treat telecom networks: as just another industry or as national security infrastructure on par with power grids. SilentAir’s tactics show that even when governments scrutinize which vendors supply hardware, weaknesses in network design, old protocols and unpatched systems can still give attackers an opening.

There’s also a clear lesson for security habits. SMS-based 2FA is better than passwords alone, but it becomes unreliable when hostile actors can read messages at the carrier level. That reality is pushing banks and tech firms toward app-based authenticators or hardware keys, although such changes take time and may not yet cover all services in the affected countries.

The next indications to watch are whether telecom regulators in the region issue new security directives, whether any operators publicly acknowledge SilentAir intrusions, and whether major banks and platforms in these markets move more aggressively away from SMS codes after this campaign.