# Houthis Use Iranian and Russian Anti-Tank Missiles Against Saudi-Backed Forces Near Bab al-Mandab

*Friday, November 6, 2026 at 2:07 PM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Published**: 2026-11-06T14:07:32.890Z (1h ago)
**Category**: conflict | **Region**: Middle East
**Importance**: 7/10
**Sources**: OSINT
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/22688.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Deck**: Houthi fighters in Yemen say they destroyed multiple vehicles belonging to Saudi‑aligned PLC forces east of the Bab al‑Mandab Strait using Iranian- and Russian‑made anti‑tank guided missiles. The strikes intensify ground pressure near a global shipping chokepoint already strained by drone and missile attacks on vessels.

Ground fighting near one of the world’s most sensitive maritime chokepoints is evolving into a showcase for imported precision weapons, as Yemen’s Houthi movement reports using Iranian and Russian anti‑tank missiles to hit Saudi‑backed forces east of the Bab al‑Mandab Strait.

Accounts close to the Houthis say Ansar Allah fighters targeted numerous vehicles operated by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) forces — a coalition of Yemeni units backed and supplied by Riyadh — with 9M133‑1/2 “Dehlavieh” and 9M113 “Konkurs” anti‑tank guided missiles. The Dehlavieh is an Iranian‑produced system derived from the Russian Kornet, while the Konkurs is a Russian‑made weapon that has circulated widely through regional conflicts.

The reports did not specify the precise number of vehicles destroyed or provide independent imagery that would allow outside verification, but the description of the systems used matters on its own. Both missiles are designed to defeat armored vehicles at long ranges, giving relatively small Houthi teams the ability to ambush convoys and static positions from stand‑off distances. For PLC troops operating in exposed desert and coastal terrain east of Bab al‑Mandab, that means that movement along key roads can carry lethal risk even without airstrikes.

For the fighters on both sides, the practical effect is clear. Houthi teams can hold ground and shape the battlefield with relatively few personnel and limited logistics. PLC units, already stretched across multiple fronts, now have to invest more in reconnaissance, armor upgrades, and counter‑ATGM tactics such as dispersal and smoke — all while knowing that a single missile hit can destroy a vehicle and kill or maim the crew in seconds.

Bab al‑Mandab is the narrow southern gateway between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, funneling much of the shipping that transits the Suez Canal. While the anti‑tank missiles in this case are aimed at land targets, their deployment so close to the strait underscores how concentrated and layered the threats have become around this corridor. Warships and commercial vessels already have to worry about Houthi anti‑ship missiles, drones and sea mines; now, the ground forces that might be called on to secure shoreline areas face a steadily more capable arsenal as well.

The use of clearly identifiable Iranian and Russian systems also reinforces the war’s international dimension. Tehran’s fingerprints on the Dehlavieh are unmistakable, bolstering Western and Gulf accusations that Iran is not just politically aligned with the Houthis but an active supplier of lethal hardware. The appearance of Konkurs missiles will invite questions about how they were transferred — whether through old Yemeni stocks, regional smuggling networks or indirect supply chains involving other conflicts.

Strategically, the engagement is another data point in a pattern where non‑state actors leverage modern guided weapons to offset their disadvantages in aircraft, armor and numbers. That trend complicates planning for Saudi Arabia and its partners, who may find that pushing Houthi units away from the immediate coastline requires far more troops and protective equipment than anticipated, with correspondingly higher costs and casualty risks.

The Bab al‑Mandab strait doesn’t need a large naval battle to become contested; a mix of anti‑ship missiles, drones, and now potent anti‑armor systems onshore can steadily raise the price of keeping it open. Shipping companies watching missile footage from nearby hillsides will factor that into routing and insurance decisions, even if no shell lands in the water.

Key developments to monitor after this latest report include any verified geolocated imagery of destroyed PLC vehicles, evidence of additional missile types turning up in Houthi hands, and whether Saudi‑backed forces reposition away from certain approach roads east of the strait. Moves by Western navies to expand coastal surveillance or by Gulf states to interdict suspected arms routes into Yemen would signal how seriously they view this incremental but persistent arming of the shoreline.