# FPV Drone Strikes in Pakistan and Myanmar Air Raids Show Airpower’s Reach in Local Wars

*Thursday, November 5, 2026 at 6:07 PM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Published**: 2026-11-05T18:07:37.089Z (46m ago)
**Category**: conflict | **Region**: South Asia
**Importance**: 8/10
**Sources**: OSINT
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/22607.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

---

**Deck**: Pakistan’s Baloch Liberation Army has used first‑person‑view kamikaze drones armed with anti‑tank warheads against security forces in Balochistan, while Myanmar’s air force has carried out fresh strikes on rebel positions in Kayin and Rakhine states. The twin developments pull soldiers and nearby civilians deeper into the line of fire from the sky.

Two separate conflicts in Asia are leaning more heavily on attacks from the air. In Pakistan’s Balochistan province, the separatist Baloch Liberation Army has carried out first‑person‑view (FPV) kamikaze drone strikes against government forces. In Myanmar, the military is bombing ethnic‑rebel positions, including near an international border.

In Pakistan, analyst account War Noir highlighted that the BLA used multiple FPV kamikaze drones fitted with PG‑7V and Type 69‑1 high‑explosive anti‑tank (HEAT) rocket‑propelled grenades against Pakistani forces in several districts of Balochistan. These are anti‑armor warheads more commonly fired from shoulder‑launched launchers, now mounted on small remotely piloted aircraft guided by operators wearing FPV goggles.

For Pakistani troops deployed in remote areas, that changes the threat picture. FPV drones are relatively cheap, can fly around terrain obstacles, and are hard to spot until they are close. They can be directed onto specific vehicles, firing positions, or observation posts that would previously have been safe from direct fire.

Civilians live in the same landscape. Balochistan’s fighting often plays out around sparsely populated towns, energy projects, and transport routes. Precision drones can, in theory, limit collateral damage compared with indiscriminate weapons, but they also normalize the idea that the airspace above markets, roads, and public buildings is part of the battlefield.

In Myanmar, the country’s armed forces are using more conventional airpower to try to contain ethnic armed groups. On 3 November 2026, two Myanmar Air Force MiG‑29SM jet fighters conducted airstrikes on Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) positions near the Myanmar–Thailand border, in the Pharpon region of Kayin State. On 5 November 2026, the army carried out combined strikes on Arakan Army (AA) rebels on Ngapye Island in the Pauktaw region of Rakhine State.

These operations show a military that struggles to hold ground relying on jets and other aircraft to pressure opponents and nearby communities. Airstrikes near the Thai border risk incidents that could draw in or unsettle a neighbor if people or firepower cross the line. Bombing around coastal areas like Ngapye can hit fishing activity and local trade in a state already suffering from conflict.

Taken together, the two theatres underline how airpower, from improvised FPV drones to fighter‑bombers, is becoming a regular feature of conflicts once dominated by ground skirmishes. In Pakistan, a non‑state actor has adapted commercial drone technology and battlefield munitions into a precision tool that complicates counterinsurgency planning. In Myanmar, a conventional air force is using its advantage to project force into contested regions.

When aircraft and armed drones enter internal wars, the distance between formal front lines and daily life shrinks. Checkpoints, village meetings, and even refugee movements can be brought under threat from above.

Next moves to watch include how Pakistani forces respond to the BLA’s FPV capability—through electronic jamming, new defenses at bases, or tactical changes—and whether similar tactics appear in other parts of the country. In Myanmar, observers will be looking at whether airstrikes intensify near borders, how neighboring states react to any spillover, and whether rebel groups gain more effective air defenses that could raise the cost and risk of the junta’s campaign.