# Russia and China’s tech push challenges U.S. ‘Pax Silica’ and reshapes chip power politics

*Monday, October 12, 2026 at 6:08 AM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Published**: 2026-10-12T06:08:20.382Z (2h ago)
**Category**: geopolitics | **Region**: Global
**Importance**: 7/10
**Sources**: OSINT
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/20326.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Deck**: A Brazilian analyst argues that Russia and China are using microchips, critical minerals and algorithms as tools of national power, directly contesting a U.S.-led ‘Pax Silica’ vision for the digital age. The emerging race could reorder supply chains and alliances as states treat tech infrastructure less like commerce and more like hard security.

The contest for global power is increasingly running through foundries, data centers and mineral mines rather than tank factories alone. In a recent assessment, Brazilian expert Alexandre Perez argued that Russia and China are actively challenging U.S. dominance in the technology sphere, treating digitalization as a core instrument of national power.

Perez pointed to the race for microchips, critical minerals and algorithms as central to a broader geopolitical competition. In his telling, Washington is promoting an initiative dubbed "Pax Silica"—a U.S.-led framework intended to secure American primacy in key digital infrastructures and supply chains. Moscow and Beijing, he said, are pushing back by building parallel ecosystems and leveraging their own resource and market advantages.

The framing aligns with a trend many governments are already acting on: technology policy is now national security policy. Advanced semiconductors underpin not just consumer electronics but modern fighter jets, missile systems, telecom networks and artificial intelligence tools. Control over chip design, manufacturing and the minerals that feed them gives states leverage well beyond the tech sector.

For Russia, sanctions and export controls imposed after the invasion of Ukraine have accelerated efforts to reduce dependence on Western hardware and software. That has meant closer technological ties with China, efforts to cultivate domestic chip production, and moves to insulate critical infrastructure from foreign digital pressure. Constraints remain severe, but the strategic intent is clear: blunt the impact of Western tech dominance on Russia’s economic and military options.

China entered this phase from a different angle, as a manufacturing powerhouse already central to global electronics supply chains but still reliant on U.S. and allied technologies at the highest end. Beijing’s response has been a combination of heavy state investment in homegrown chip design and fabrication, stockpiling of critical minerals, and diplomatic outreach to resource‑rich states in Latin America, Africa and Central Asia.

In this landscape, "algorithms" are not just code—they are the decision‑making engines behind surveillance systems, recommendation platforms and battlefield targeting tools. States that shape how these algorithms are built and where they run can project influence deep into societies and across borders. That is why access to data, cloud infrastructure and AI expertise now features in trade talks and security dialogues alongside tariffs and troop deployments.

The concept of a U.S.-led Pax Silica suggests an ambition to lock in relatively liberal, Western‑aligned rules for the digital order, from standards on data flows to control of key semiconductor chokepoints. Russia and China’s efforts to create alternative standards and supply pathways turn that into a contested space rather than a default outcome.

For smaller states and companies, the emerging split presents hard choices. Aligning with one ecosystem or another can determine what hardware is available, whose surveillance or encryption standards apply, and which markets remain open. Countries with deposits of lithium, cobalt, rare earths and other critical minerals suddenly find themselves courted not only with investment but with security partnerships and political expectations.

One lesson stands out from Perez’s assessment: a disruption in chip or mineral flows anywhere can have cascading effects well beyond consumer prices. Semiconductor or critical mineral risk does not require a full embargo; a hint of political pressure or export restriction can prompt companies and governments to rewire supply chains with long‑term strategic consequences.

Signals to watch include how far the United States pushes export controls under its Pax Silica framework, the depth of Russia–China cooperation on chip and data infrastructure, and whether key mineral‑producing countries tie access to explicit security guarantees. Concrete moves on any of those fronts will show whether tech competition remains a slow burn or hardens into more formal economic blocs.