# Ukrainian drones hammer Russian‑held power grid with repeated strikes on substations and gas sites

*Wednesday, September 23, 2026 at 6:21 AM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Published**: 2026-09-23T06:21:38.666Z (2h ago)
**Category**: conflict | **Region**: Eastern Europe
**Importance**: 8/10
**Sources**: OSINT
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/18623.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Deck**: Over the past week, Ukrainian mid‑range drones have struck at least two 220 kV substations, five 110 kV substations, 17 other substations and 10 gas distribution stations in Russian‑held areas and nearby Russian regions, hitting the backbone of occupied‑area electricity and gas networks.

Away from front‑line battles, Ukraine is targeting the wiring and valves that keep Russian‑controlled areas powered and heated.

Over the last week, Ukrainian mid‑range drones have repeatedly struck energy and gas infrastructure across Russian‑controlled parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv oblasts, as well as in Crimea and regions over the Russian border. Recent strikes hit at least two 220 kV electrical substations, five 110 kV substations and 17 other substations of unspecified size. Ukrainian drones also targeted 10 different gas distribution stations.

Substations at 220 kV and 110 kV are core nodes in regional power networks, linking long‑distance transmission lines to local distribution grids. Damaging them can trigger wide outages, force emergency rerouting of electricity and stress equipment that was never designed for repeated wartime disruption. Gas distribution stations act as pressure‑control and junction points; hits there can cut supply to whole districts.

Ukraine’s leaders have framed such operations as part of a broader energy campaign. President Volodymyr Zelensky has said that strikes on refineries are intended to deprive Russia of diesel and claimed that Ukrainian forces have destroyed a large share of Russia’s refinery capacity. The pattern of attacks on substations and gas infrastructure suggests an effort to expand this pressure, not just on fuel production and exports but on the basic functioning of occupied territories and nearby Russian regions.

For civilians in those areas, the results are concrete. Power cuts interrupt hospital services, water pumping and mobile networks. Disrupted gas supplies affect cooking and, in colder weather, heating. Businesses that had adjusted to new local authorities now face outages and uncertainty about repair times.

Russia’s military and energy managers must decide how to allocate scarce resources. Each damaged transformer or gas station requires money, equipment and trained staff, and repair crews work under the risk of follow‑up strikes. Air‑defence units, already under pressure as Ukrainian drones range further into Russia, now have to defend a growing list of fixed energy targets. In parallel, residents of Ufa in central Russia reported a loud noise and then a column of black smoke near an oil refinery, adding to signs that energy sites far from the front are also under threat.

The campaign reflects Ukrainian adaptation after two winters of absorbing Russian missile and drone attacks on its own grid. Now, Ukraine is using relatively cheap, expendable drones against specific points in the system on the other side of the front line and inside Russia.

An energy system doesn’t have to collapse entirely to become a liability; it only has to be unreliable enough that planners can’t trust it. Knocking out a few substations or gas stations at critical moments can force risky improvisation.

What comes next will depend on Russia’s ability to repair or harden these facilities, signs of added physical protection or short‑range air defences around key sites, and whether Ukraine extends such strikes deeper into the Russian interior. Evidence of sustained outages in particular cities, or visible moves by Russia to disperse and decentralise its energy assets, would suggest the campaign is biting.