# Sudan’s Civil War Widens: RSF Advances on Blue Nile as Army Pushes Through Kordofan

*Sunday, September 13, 2026 at 8:05 PM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Published**: 2026-09-13T20:05:43.814Z (1h ago)
**Category**: conflict | **Region**: Africa
**Importance**: 8/10
**Sources**: OSINT
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/17721.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Deck**: Sudan’s rival forces are opening new fronts instead of slowing the war, with the army advancing across Kordofan’s desert while the Rapid Support Forces push north along the Blue Nile and capture the town of Al Bikora. The moves risk drawing more civilians into the fighting and reshaping control of key corridors connecting eastern, central and southern Sudan.

Sudan’s civil war is spreading into regions that had, until recently, sat on the margins of the fighting. Fresh field updates from late August and early September show both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) widening their campaigns in Kordofan and along the Blue Nile, signaling that neither side is preparing for talks or a freeze.

On the Kordofan front in early September, the SAF expanded operations across the desert belt that links central Sudan with Darfur and the south. Government troops conducted search‑and‑clear missions in Abu Uruq and Safiya in the north, while in the south they pushed westward from Jabrat al‑Sheikh to reach Hamra al‑Waz. These movements, though not accompanied by detailed casualty figures, suggest the army is trying to secure supply routes and disrupt RSF mobility across sparsely populated terrain that can hide convoys and training camps.

Further southeast, on the Blue Nile front, the RSF has been on the offensive. In the second half of August, RSF units advanced along the Qaysan axis, moving north with little resistance after the withdrawal of the SAF’s 13th Brigade. By late August, they had captured the town of Al Bikora, consolidating control over an area that straddles key roads and river routes. Fighting between SAF and RSF also raged a few kilometers east of Al Dinder, another significant point in the Blue Nile region.

For civilians, these shifts mean new communities pulled directly into the war. Towns like Al Bikora and rural settlements near Abu Uruq, Safiya or Hamra al‑Waz are not just dots on a military map; they are home to farmers, traders and displaced families who had hoped front lines would pass them by. As forces change hands, residents face the familiar cycle: looting, forced recruitment, roadblocks, and the risk of being caught in shelling or air strikes.

The Kordofan and Blue Nile theaters are strategically important beyond their local populations. Kordofan is a crossroads linking the capital area to Darfur and the South Sudan border. Control there shapes who can move troops, weapons and humanitarian aid across western Sudan. The Blue Nile corridor, meanwhile, connects eastern Sudan and the Ethiopian borderlands to the country’s center. RSF gains along the Qaysan axis and in places like Al Bikora threaten to sever or complicate government supply lines and could give the paramilitary leverage over agricultural and gold‑rich zones.

The twin advances, by opposing sides on different fronts, challenge any narrative that the war is stabilizing into static lines. Instead, Sudan’s conflict map is becoming more complex and fragmented, with both SAF and RSF seeking new territorial and economic footholds. Each new town captured becomes a bargaining chip for future negotiations — but only after its residents have endured occupation, displacement or worse.

There’s a crisp way to think about the stakes: every time Sudan’s war jumps to a new province, it doesn’t just redraw a front line — it redraws who eats, who trades, and who can flee.

The critical indicators to watch in the coming weeks are whether SAF can hold its gains in Kordofan or push further toward RSF‑held zones, whether RSF consolidates control around Al Bikora and moves closer to Al Dinder, and how humanitarian agencies manage access to newly contested areas. Any sign of cross‑border spillover into Ethiopia or South Sudan, or of armed groups exploiting the vacuum in Kordofan’s rural belts, would mark another dangerous turn in a war that is already tearing apart Sudan’s social and territorial fabric.