# Ukraine readies air force ‘surprises’ for Russia as Western jets eye local production

*Saturday, August 22, 2026 at 8:05 PM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Published**: 2026-08-22T20:05:11.355Z (2h ago)
**Category**: conflict | **Region**: Eastern Europe
**Importance**: 7/10
**Sources**: OSINT
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/15395.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Deck**: Ukraine’s air force chief says Su‑25 attack jets are being upgraded with new weapons and "surprises" for Russian forces, while foreign aircraft suppliers are prepared to localize production and maintenance in Ukraine when security allows. The twin tracks point to a longer air war in which Ukraine seeks not just Western deliveries but a domestic aerospace footprint.

Ukraine is signaling that its air war with Russia will be fought on more than one timeline. On the near horizon, the commander of the Ukrainian Air Force says aging Su‑25 attack aircraft are being modernized and armed with new weapons, promising unspecified "surprises" for Russian troops. Further out, he says foreign aircraft suppliers are ready to localize both production and maintenance in Ukraine itself—if the security situation permits.

In comments released ahead of Ukraine’s Air Force Day on 22 August, Colonel Oleksandr Dyakiv outlined how Kyiv sees its air capabilities evolving. Speaking in a video interview promoted by the military, Dyakiv said that Su‑25 jets, a Soviet‑era mainstay for close air support, are "far from retirement". According to his remarks, these aircraft are increasing their capabilities as Ukrainian crews master new types of munitions and tactics. He hinted that there are "plans, developments" and that "we have surprises for the Russians," without disclosing technical details that could compromise operational security.

Dyakiv also addressed Ukraine’s longer‑term dependence on foreign suppliers. In a separate statement, he said that contracts for foreign‑made aircraft include provisions for localizing production and servicing in Ukraine. Implementation, he stressed, will depend on the security environment. That caveat speaks to the reality that advanced manufacturing facilities for Western jets would be high‑value targets for Russian missile and drone strikes, and cannot be safely established while much of the country remains within range of regular bombardment.

For Ukrainian pilots and ground crews, the message is both reassurance and pressure. Crews flying low and fast in Su‑25s over contested front lines know they are operating some of the most vulnerable platforms in the conflict, facing dense Russian air defenses. Upgrades in precision and stand‑off range can make the difference between being able to hit Russian positions and being forced to fly suicidal profiles. At the same time, they are being asked to bridge the gap until Western fighter jets arrive in greater numbers and domestic support infrastructure can take shape.

On the Russian side, Dyakiv’s comments signal that Ukrainian attack aviation remains a live threat, not a legacy force to be ignored. Moscow has touted the destruction of Ukrainian aircraft and airfields, and has increasingly relied on glide bombs and stand‑off missiles to pound Ukrainian positions while keeping its own aircraft away from front‑line air defenses. A more capable Su‑25 fleet—paired with new Western‑supplied jets when they arrive—would complicate Russian planning and could force the redeployment of air defense assets.

Strategically, the prospect of localized production and maintenance of foreign fighters in Ukraine would deepen the country’s integration into Western defense industrial networks. It would reduce logistical delays, cut dependence on foreign bases for heavy maintenance, and entrench Western aerospace firms in Ukraine’s economy. For NATO states, that offers both an opportunity to anchor Ukraine more firmly in the Euro‑Atlantic security architecture and a risk of drawing their industrial assets closer to the front line of a hot war with Russia.

For Ukraine’s broader economy and workforce, an eventual aircraft production and service hub would mean high‑skill jobs, technology transfer and a long‑term stake in rebuilding after the war. But the condition Dyakiv underscored—"depending on the security situation"—is not a small print detail. As long as Russia can strike factories and airfields with relative impunity, any large, fixed aerospace facility on Ukrainian soil would need extensive air and missile defense to avoid becoming another crater.

The most telling signals in the months ahead will be whether Ukraine begins to field visibly upgraded Su‑25s with new munitions on key sectors of the front, how quickly Western fighter deliveries translate into operational squadrons, and whether any public steps are taken toward siting joint production or maintenance centers in Ukraine. Russian propaganda and targeting patterns will offer an indirect gauge: increased focus on hitting Ukrainian air bases and industrial sites would indicate that Moscow takes Kyiv’s air ambitions seriously.