# Iran Claims U.S. Accepted 10-Point Plan, Talks Still Deadlocked *Saturday, April 18, 2026 at 2:15 PM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk* **Published**: 2026-04-18T14:15:52.896Z (20d ago) **Category**: geopolitics | **Region**: Middle East **Importance**: 7/10 **Sources**: OSINT **Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/1307.md **Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries --- **Deck**: Iran’s Supreme National Security Council said on 18 April 2026 that Washington has accepted a 10-point Iranian framework to end the current conflict, mediated by Pakistan. Yet Tehran insists no date is set for further talks, blaming U.S. ‘excessive demands’ and pressure tactics, including a naval blockade and demands over enriched uranium. ## Key Takeaways - Iran’s Supreme National Security Council claims the U.S. has accepted a 10-point Iranian plan as a framework for negotiations to end the war, following 21 hours of talks mediated by Pakistan. - Tehran says talks are stalled due to new “excessive demands” from Washington and vows not to retreat from its positions or hand over enriched uranium to the U.S. - Iranian officials link renewed closure of the Strait of Hormuz to the U.S. naval blockade, using the strait as leverage while insisting Iran manages its security. - Trump says conversations with Iran are ongoing and that he will know by the end of 18 April if a deal is possible, but publicly criticises Tehran for trying to “close up the strait again.” - The disconnect between public narratives and on-the-ground escalation raises the risk of miscalculation even as a negotiation framework nominally exists. On 18 April 2026, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) issued a detailed account of recent contacts with the United States, claiming that Washington has accepted a 10-point Iranian plan as the framework for negotiations to end the ongoing conflict. According to the SNSC, these talks, mediated by Pakistan, lasted 21 hours without interruption. Iranian officials asserted that they engaged in the discussions despite “deep mistrust” of the United States, and characterised the process as a response to U.S. and allied “defeats on the battlefield,” after which those adversaries allegedly began requesting ceasefires and negotiations. Tehran’s version of events portrays Iran as adopting a firm but pragmatic negotiating posture. The SNSC claims that while the U.S. accepted Iran’s overarching framework, it subsequently introduced new “excessive demands” during the talks. Iranian negotiators, according to the statement, made clear that they would not retreat from their core positions, which include preserving control over their nuclear programme and regional security posture. This stance is reinforced by public comments from Iran’s deputy foreign minister, who reiterated on 18 April that no date has been set for a second round of talks and that Iran will not hand over its enriched uranium to the United States. In parallel, Iranian officials have tied their decision to re-close the Strait of Hormuz and fire on commercial shipping to what they describe as U.S. violations of the ceasefire through a naval blockade and “piracy” against Iranian coastal and port facilities. The SNSC announced that Iran will maintain control and monitoring of the Strait until the war fully ends, insisting that all vessels provide full information, receive clearance under Iranian regulations, and comply with security, safety, and environmental conditions and costs. Any attempt at disruption or blockade by others, they warned, will be treated as a violation of international law. From Washington’s side, President Trump has acknowledged ongoing contacts with Iran but framed them differently. Speaking to reporters in the Oval Office on 18 April, he accused Iran of trying to "get clever" and "close up the strait again" for blackmail. He maintained that the United States cannot be blackmailed, yet noted that conversations are “going very well” and that he expects to know by the end of the day whether both sides will move forward to a deal. This dual messaging—combining public toughness with hints of diplomatic progress—is likely intended to manage domestic political pressures while maintaining bargaining power. Iranian domestic politics are also shaping the trajectory of talks. Parliamentary figures and hardliners have criticised perceived conciliatory signals from the foreign ministry regarding the strait, warning against “calming the markets” and insisting that Iran should not waste time on “long and futile” negotiations. The Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has praised the navy’s readiness to inflict “new bitter defeats” on enemies, emphasising patience but also hinting that patience has limits. This rhetoric constrains negotiators’ room for manoeuvre and raises the cost of any compromise that could be framed as a climb-down. The negotiation dynamics are further complicated by the parallel escalation at sea and in Lebanon. Iran’s re-closure of the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with attacks on commercial vessels, is both a pressure tactic and a major international liability, given the strait’s role in global energy flows. Iran also frames conflict in Lebanon and Israeli operations there as part of the same confrontation, viewing itself as the hub of a wider regional axis. Washington, for its part, has deployed the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier group into the Red Sea, enhancing its ability to project power as talks hang in the balance. ## Outlook & Way Forward In the near term, the existence of a 10-point framework, if accurately described, offers a potential path toward de-escalation—but only if both sides can synchronise diplomatic moves with concrete steps to reduce tensions at sea and on land. Key elements likely include phased easing of U.S. maritime pressure in exchange for verifiable relaxation of Iranian restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, constraints on regional proxy activity, and some form of nuclear or enrichment-related assurances short of full surrender of enriched uranium. However, the risk is high that domestic politics and mutual mistrust will sink the process. Tehran has publicly locked itself into positions that limit flexibility, especially on nuclear material and control of the strait, while Washington faces its own electoral and alliance-management pressures. Any new U.S. sanctions, additional Iranian attacks on shipping, or high-casualty incidents involving U.S. or allied forces could abruptly derail the fragile diplomatic channel. Observers should watch for concrete confidence-building measures, such as a temporary reduction in the intensity of naval encounters, partial reopening of the strait to monitored traffic, or technical talks at the expert level on nuclear and maritime issues. The absence of such steps, combined with continued harsh public rhetoric, would indicate that the 10-point plan is more a tool for narrative warfare than a real roadmap. Under that scenario, the likely trajectory is toward a prolonged low-intensity confrontation with intermittent crises, rather than a decisive settlement.