# FARC-EP fighters raising flag near La Gabarra exposes Colombia’s fragile peace

*Thursday, July 23, 2026 at 2:04 AM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Published**: 2026-07-23T02:04:07.898Z (3h ago)
**Category**: conflict | **Region**: Latin America
**Importance**: 8/10
**Sources**: OSINT
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/articles/12104.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Deck**: Footage from northeastern Colombia shows armed FARC-EP fighters entering a town near La Gabarra in Tibú and raising their flag, a visual challenge to Bogotá’s control in a region scarred by past war. The display puts civilians, local officials, and oil and coca routes back in the crosshairs as Colombia’s uneasy post-conflict order comes under renewed strain.

Armed fighters claiming the name and legacy of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia have again appeared in public with weapons and flags, this time near the oil‑town corridor of La Gabarra in Tibú, raising fresh doubts about how much of Colombia’s peace is still only on paper. Video circulated on 23 July UTC shows dozens of uniformed men, some carrying Kalashnikov‑pattern rifles, entering a town in the northeastern border area and hoisting the FARC‑EP flag, an unmistakable signal to locals that Bogotá’s writ is contested on the ground.

The footage, geolocated by independent observers to the vicinity of La Gabarra in the municipality of Tibú, Norte de Santander, depicts fighters in camouflage and armbands walking in loose formation along a dirt road and in a built‑up area. Several appear to be armed with AK‑pattern rifles chambered in 7.62x39 mm, a common weapon in Colombia’s long conflict. The video does not show direct clashes with security forces, but the act of raising a flag in a populated area is itself a form of territorial claim, especially in a region where state presence has often been thin.

La Gabarra and the wider Catatumbo region sit on top of strategic fault lines: they are close to the border with Venezuela, lie astride important oil infrastructure, and overlap with some of the country’s densest coca‑growing areas. For residents, seeing an organized, armed column march openly through town is a warning that the old certainties of the peace process are fraying. Shopkeepers, teachers, and local officials are forced to read between the lines: who really holds authority here, and what does that mean for extortion, forced recruitment, and the risk of being caught between armed groups and the state?

Operationally, the appearance of FARC‑EP fighters in such a visible, choreographed way suggests several things at once. First, they felt confident enough in their numbers and local support—or at least local fear—to move in daylight and allow themselves to be filmed. Second, their presence near La Gabarra hints at a desire to control corridors important for both the legal oil economy and the illegal drug trade, offering leverage over pipelines, roads, and smuggling routes that connect Colombia’s interior to Venezuela and beyond.

For Bogotá, the scenes from Tibú come at a difficult moment in efforts to negotiate with various armed factions that splintered from the original FARC after the 2016 peace accord. Some groups use the FARC‑EP label to claim political lineage while operating largely as criminal enterprises. Others mix ideological grievances with control of illicit economies. When such groups can raise their flag in a town with apparent impunity, it undercuts government narratives that they are contained or merely residual.

Regional security dynamics also come into sharper focus. The Catatumbo area has long been a patchwork of influence between Colombian armed actors and Venezuelan structures, both state and non‑state. Open displays of FARC‑EP presence raise questions about cross‑border sanctuaries, the flow of weapons and fighters, and the capacity—or willingness—of both governments to coordinate security in frontier zones. Neighboring communities on the Venezuelan side watch closely, knowing that any shift in control on the Colombian side can push violence and displacement across the border.

For international observers and investors, especially those linked to Colombia’s energy sector, images of armed groups asserting control near oil routes revive old worries. Infrastructure in Norte de Santander has historically been vulnerable to bombings, extortion, and blockades. A resurgence of visible insurgent presence increases operational risk for pipeline operators and contractors and complicates the state’s efforts to extend development and basic services into historically neglected areas.

One sentence captures the stakes: when a rebel flag goes up over a town square, it is not just a symbol—it is a public audit of how much of the state actually exists beyond the capital’s maps.

What to watch next includes any official confirmation or denial from Colombia’s government regarding the group’s identity and numbers, visible military or police deployments into the La Gabarra–Tibú corridor, and reports from local civil society or church organizations about new threats, recruitments, or displacements. The trajectory of peace talks with armed groups using the FARC‑EP name, and any signs of cross‑border friction or cooperation with Venezuela over these incidents, will show whether this is a local display of strength or part of a broader campaign to redraw Colombia’s security map.