# [WARNING] Iran Security Chief Threatens Missile Strikes on U.S. Bases and ‘Distant Islands’

*Friday, November 13, 2026 at 2:22 AM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Detected**: 2026-11-13T02:22:23.299Z (29m ago)
**Tags**: Iran, United States, Missiles, GulfStates, Energy, Defense, MiddleEast
**Sources**: https://t.me/operativnoZSU/226003 | https://t.me/warmonitors/46651 | https://t.me/warmonitors/46650 | https://t.me/warmonitors/46649 | https://t.me/primiciasec/21116
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/alerts/30188.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Summary**: Iran’s top security official warned around 01:29 UTC that any country hosting U.S. bases used to attack Iran will be treated as a direct enemy target, and claimed Iranian missiles could hit ‘islands’ Washington assumes are beyond reach. The statements widen the potential battlefield to Gulf host nations and key offshore assets, raising oil, shipping, and defense‑risk calculations even before any U.S.–Iran clash begins.

## Detail

Iran signaled a broader, more aggressive deterrence posture overnight, as Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, warned that Tehran will view any country hosting U.S. bases used in an attack as a direct combatant — and claimed Iranian missiles could reach ‘some islands’ the United States believes lie beyond Iranian strike range. Issued around 01:29 UTC, the remarks expand the prospective target set in any U.S.–Iran confrontation from bilateral strikes to a regional battlefield involving Gulf host states and forward U.S. positions.

According to Spanish‑language reporting circulated on social channels, Rezaei advised all states with U.S. military bases not to ‘cooperate with any U.S. military attack against Iran’ and stated that any location from which U.S. aircraft take off would be considered a threat. In a follow‑on quote, he warned that if the United States ‘acts recklessly, we could attack some islands they believe are out of range of our missiles.’ These statements appear on the record, attributed to Iran’s top national security official, giving them higher weight than generic media commentary, though there is no independent confirmation of any corresponding military readiness change yet.

For governments and populations across the Gulf and wider region, the human and political stakes are direct. Countries such as Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE and potentially others host major U.S. air and naval facilities within missile range of Iran. Rezaei’s framing attempts to force those governments to calculate whether allowing U.S. operations from their soil could draw retaliatory fire on urban‑adjacent bases, energy terminals, ports, and nearby civilian infrastructure. Offshore islands and installations — including airstrips, listening posts, and potentially energy‑linked facilities — are implicitly placed under threat, raising concern for workers, expatriate communities, and critical service continuity.

Militarily, the rhetoric signals that Iran wants to convert U.S. regional basing into a vulnerability rather than a net advantage. By threatening long‑range missile strikes on ‘distant islands,’ Tehran is telegraphing confidence in its precision‑strike and anti‑access capabilities, even if the exact systems and ranges are not specified. U.S. and allied planners will need to reassess dispersal, hardening, and missile‑defense coverage not only for main operating bases on the Gulf littoral but also for more isolated facilities. Host nations may come under domestic political pressure to limit U.S. sortie generation from their territory in any conflict scenario to avoid becoming primary targets.

Markets and supply chains are most exposed through energy and maritime channels. Any credible movement from rhetoric to deployment — for example, Iranian missile units repositioning toward Gulf coasts or islands — would lift the geopolitical risk premium on Brent and WTI, and could prompt precautionary route or insurance adjustments for tankers transiting near U.S. bases and offshore infrastructure. Defense equities linked to missile defense, ISR, and hardened basing solutions would likely benefit, while Gulf sovereign credit and FX could see volatility if investors price a higher probability of direct strikes on host nations.

Over the next 24–48 hours, key indicators include: whether Iranian state media amplify Rezaei’s remarks as formal doctrine or treat them as one‑off; any visible changes in Iranian ballistic and cruise missile force posture, especially facing the Gulf and key islands; messaging or protest notes from Gulf governments that host U.S. forces; and any U.S. Central Command adjustments in basing footprint, air‑defense readiness, or public deterrent messaging. A move from verbal threats to observable force movements, or reciprocal U.S. warnings, would escalate this from rhetorical brinkmanship to an immediate operational risk for regional energy and security architectures.

**MARKET IMPACT ASSESSMENT:**
Raises geopolitical risk premium for crude and regional equities, supports defensive bid in gold and U.S. Treasuries, and may pressure currencies and sovereign spreads of Gulf states hosting U.S. bases if escalation signals intensify.