# [WARNING] Reports: Iraq, Turkey Agree to Withdraw Turkish Forces From Key Bases by 2026

*Wednesday, September 23, 2026 at 10:31 AM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Detected**: 2026-09-23T10:31:53.731Z (2h ago)
**Tags**: Iraq, Turkey, Kurdistan, MiddleEast, Energy, Security, Oil
**Sources**: OSINT
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/alerts/23790.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Summary**: A security source in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region says Ankara will hand the Beşika and Zelkên bases to the Iraqi army by end‑2026, curbing a decade of unilateral Turkish ground presence near Mosul. If implemented, the move shifts the security balance in northern Iraq, weakening Turkey’s direct leverage over Kurdish factions and changing risk calculus for energy corridors, investors and regional powers that rely on Iraqi stability.

## Detail

A security source in the Kurdistan Region reports at 10:01 UTC that Iraq and Turkey have reached an agreement for Turkish forces to withdraw from the Beşika and Zelkên bases and transfer them to the Iraqi army by the end of 2026. These positions sit in the greater Mosul area and have been central to Turkey’s long-running campaign against the PKK and related Kurdish groups inside Iraq. The same source notes the status of other Turkish bases in the Kurdistan Region remains unresolved, suggesting a partial but meaningful restructuring of Ankara’s military footprint rather than a full exit.

The report is single‑sourced so far and not yet formally confirmed by Baghdad or Ankara, but it aligns with Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al‑Zaidi’s ongoing negotiations with Turkey over cross‑border operations and sovereignty issues. Timing is gradual—over a roughly two‑year horizon—but the political direction is clear: more Iraqi central control over foreign deployments near key population centers and economic corridors.

For people on the ground in Nineveh and the Kurdistan Region, a credible withdrawal roadmap would lower the frequency of Turkish air and artillery strikes around Mosul’s periphery and reduce the risk that urban areas or IDP communities are caught in cross‑border fire. It could also shift internal Iraqi power dynamics, bolstering Baghdad’s hand versus both Erbil and armed Kurdish and Shi’a factions, as responsibility for security and counter‑militant operations around Mosul shifts formally to the Iraqi state.

Militarily, Beşika and Zelkên are forward nodes supporting intelligence, artillery, and special forces operations against the PKK and other groups. Their transition to Iraqi army control would force Turkey to rely more on over‑the‑horizon strike assets, intelligence sharing, and possibly new basing arrangements that are more tightly regulated. That reduces Ankara’s unilateral on‑the‑ground options but may open the way for a more formalized, jointly managed security framework with Baghdad. Non‑state actors in the area—PKK elements, Iran‑aligned militias, and local Arab and Kurdish armed groups—will read this as both an opportunity and a risk, testing how quickly and effectively Iraqi forces can fill any vacuum.

Economically, northern Iraq hosts critical oil infrastructure and the route of the Iraq–Turkey pipeline to Ceyhan, even if flows are currently constrained by legal and political disputes. A de‑conflicted security environment around Mosul marginally improves the long‑term risk profile for pipeline repairs, new energy projects, and logistics corridors tying Iraq to Mediterranean export routes. For international oil companies and service providers, the key question is whether reduced Turkish boots on the ground translates into fewer uncoordinated strikes and clearer lines of authority with Baghdad.

For markets, this prospective shift points to a very gradual easing of geopolitical risk premia tied to northern Iraqi export disruptions and cross‑border clashes, though the horizon (end‑2026) limits immediate price impact. Brent and WTI are unlikely to react sharply today, but energy traders and insurers should factor in a scenario where Baghdad consolidates more predictable control over security in the Mosul corridor. Defense and drone‑warfare equities with exposure to Turkish operations may face a modest headwind over time if Ankara’s on‑the‑ground campaign is constrained.

Over the next 24–48 hours, watch for: (1) on‑record confirmation or denial from Baghdad, Ankara, and the Kurdistan Regional Government; (2) any parallel announcements on the status of remaining Turkish bases deeper in the Kurdistan Region; and (3) reactions from PKK-linked channels and Iran‑aligned militias, which will signal whether they intend to contest or exploit the transition. Any linkage between this base deal and negotiations over the Iraq–Turkey pipeline or broader security cooperation would materially raise its strategic and market significance.

**MARKET IMPACT ASSESSMENT:**
Iraq–Turkey base handover points to gradual de‑escalation of direct Turkish ground presence near Iraqi oil and transit corridors, modestly reducing long‑tail supply and pipeline disruption risk. The fresh Kyiv strikes reinforce upside risk premia on air defense, UAV, and cyber-resilient infrastructure names while marginally supporting safe-haven flows (gold, USD) and Ukrainian sovereign risk spreads.