# [FLASH] Iran vows Hormuz closure until Netanyahu ousted

*Friday, September 18, 2026 at 8:09 PM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk*

**Detected**: 2026-09-18T20:09:24.301Z (2h ago)
**Tags**: MARKET, ENERGY, oil, LNG, Middle East, risk-premium, shipping
**Sources**: OSINT
**Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/alerts/23214.md
**Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries

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**Summary**: A senior Iranian adviser warned that the Strait of Hormuz will not be reopened until Israeli PM Netanyahu leaves power. In context of an already ongoing US‑Iran war and prior closure, this hardens expectations of a prolonged disruption to Gulf crude and product flows, supporting a structurally higher energy risk premium.

## Detail

An adviser to Iran’s leadership, Mohamad Baqer Zolghadr, has stated that the Strait of Hormuz will not be reopened “until Netanyahu is gone.” Against the backdrop of a more than six‑month US‑Iran conflict and no visible progress on a deal to reopen Hormuz, this turns what markets may have hoped was a temporary closure into a more explicitly open‑ended political condition.

Roughly 17–20 million bpd of crude and condensate and a large share of global seaborne LNG normally transit Hormuz. With the strait already constrained due to the war, the incremental information here is not fresh physical damage but a clear signal that Tehran is tying any reopening to a highly uncertain Israeli domestic political outcome. That increases the probability that current disruptions could persist for many months, if not longer, rather than resolving via a near‑term ceasefire or narrow US‑Iran channel.

The supply‑side impact is twofold: (1) sustained loss or diversion of Gulf exports (Iran, potentially spillover impacts on Iraq, Qatar, UAE, and Saudi loadings depending on risk tolerance and insurance constraints), and (2) a durable increase in shipping and insurance costs for any remaining traffic. While some regional producers can reroute limited volumes via alternative pipelines (e.g., east‑west Saudi pipelines to the Red Sea, UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah), these are insufficient to fully offset a protracted Hormuz impairment.

Historically, threats to Hormuz (1979–80, 1984–88, 2011–12) have added several dollars per barrel to crude benchmarks through risk premium alone. Today’s statement reinforces that this is not a short shock but potentially a structural regime of elevated geopolitical risk. That supports higher Brent and WTI, wider Dubai–Brent spreads, and stronger Middle East crude differentials. LNG and naphtha benchmarks in Asia also retain upside risk given Qatar’s exposure.

Duration of impact is likely medium to long term: until there is either regime‑level change in Iran’s stance, a major shift in Israel’s leadership, or an external security arrangement that credibly guarantees passage. Markets should price in an extended period of elevated volatility in energy and related freight and insurance markets.

**AFFECTED ASSETS:** Brent Crude, WTI Crude, Dubai Crude, Gasoil futures, Asian LNG spot (JKM), Tanker insurance premia, Middle East sovereign CDS, USD/IRR, USD/ILS