# [FLASH] Iran, IRGC Claim New Drone, Missile Barrages on U.S. Bases in Kuwait, Bahrain *Monday, July 13, 2026 at 4:25 AM UTC — Hamer Intelligence Services Desk* **Detected**: 2026-07-13T04:25:36.621Z (2h ago) **Tags**: United States, Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Air Bases, Drones **Sources**: OSINT **Permalink**: https://hamerintel.com/data/alerts/14223.md **Source**: https://hamerintel.com/summaries --- **Summary**: Iran’s army and IRGC now both claim direct drone and missile strikes on U.S. positions in Kuwait and renewed hits in Bahrain around 04:00 UTC, escalating a live-fire exchange with Washington across the Gulf. The widening, overt clash risks drawing Gulf host nations deeper into the fight and puts U.S. basing, regional energy flows, and shipping near the Strait of Hormuz under intensified threat. ## Detail Iranian military forces say they have launched a new wave of drone and missile attacks against U.S. targets in Kuwait and Bahrain early Monday, turning a series of strikes into a sustained cross-Gulf confrontation with direct implications for U.S. basing, Gulf monarchies, and global energy flows. Around 04:00 UTC on 13 July, multiple OSINT and regional channels reported that Iran had fired “more missiles and drones at Bahrain,” with air defenses engaged and observers citing a possible 5–6 new direct impacts (Reports 7, 11, 13). Almost simultaneously, Iran’s regular army publicly announced it had joined the IRGC in striking U.S. positions in Kuwait, saying it conducted “a series of drone attacks against the location of U.S. forces, air defense systems, missile systems, shelters and support facilities” (Report 12). Earlier at 03:22 UTC, the IRGC itself claimed it had hit Ali Al-Salem and Ahmed Al-Jaber air bases in Kuwait, alleging destruction of fuel tanks, a Patriot battery, and an FPS radar (Report 1); additional OSINT attributed the strikes to Arash‑2 one‑way attack drones (Report 8). These claims follow U.S. Central Command’s confirmation of three rounds of strikes this week on roughly 140 Iranian targets and fresh U.S. strikes on Iran reported minutes earlier (Reports 2–4). Many Iranian claims remain partially unverified, especially reported kills on U.S. systems, but the pattern is clear: Tehran is now openly framing these as joint IRGC–Army operations, and Bahrain and Kuwait are active battlefields, not just host platforms. For residents in Bahrain and near Kuwaiti bases, this means renewed explosions, interception debris risk, and potential disruption around critical U.S. installations that sit close to civilian zones and logistics hubs. For governments in Bahrain and Kuwait, the stakes have shifted from proxy risk to direct vulnerability: repeated barrages risk casualties, political blowback over hosting U.S. forces, and pressure on emergency planning for critical infrastructure. U.S. personnel and contractors at Ali Al‑Salem, Ahmed Al‑Jaber, and U.S. facilities in Bahrain are now in a high-tempo threat environment, potentially constraining sortie generation, air defense posture, and logistics. Any confirmed degradation of Patriot batteries or radar coverage would force rapid repositioning of assets and could open exploitable windows for further Iranian strikes. Strategically, Iran is signaling it can simultaneously pressure U.S. bases in multiple Gulf monarchies while under heavy bombardment at home, and that its regular army is now co-owning the fight, not just the IRGC. This increases escalation risk: miscalculation or higher U.S. casualties could drive Washington toward broader suppression of Iranian launch infrastructure, including near key energy and shipping nodes along the Persian Gulf littoral. Markets are exposed through three channels. First, repeated strikes on Bahrain and Kuwaiti bases within hours of U.S. attacks on Iranian targets around the Strait of Hormuz raise the perceived probability of spillover to export terminals, pipelines, and associated power and desalination plants. That supports a price premium on Brent and Dubai benchmarks and stiffens tanker freight and war-risk insurance costs. Second, heightened U.S.-Iran confrontation typically boosts defense equities and safe-haven assets such as gold and U.S. Treasuries, while weighing on risk assets in GCC markets and select EM FX. Third, any temporary disruption or precautionary slowdown in Gulf crude loadings, LNG flows, or port operations would quickly ripple into refinery margins, shipping schedules, and petrochemical feedstock pricing. Over the next 24–48 hours, key watchpoints are: (1) confirmation from U.S. or Kuwaiti/Bahraini authorities on damage at Ali Al‑Salem, Ahmed Al‑Jaber, and U.S. sites in Bahrain, especially any impact on air defense or fuel infrastructure; (2) evidence that Iran is targeting or preparing to target energy export infrastructure, port facilities, or shipping near Hormuz; (3) any decision by Bahrain, Kuwait, or other Gulf hosts to restrict U.S. operations or quietly relocate assets; and (4) U.S. signaling on whether its next response remains limited to Iranian military nodes or expands to a broader campaign that could further destabilize Gulf energy flows. A move toward even partial port or terminal disruption, or a confirmed hit on Gulf energy assets, would likely trigger a sharper repricing across oil, marine insurance, and related equities. **MARKET IMPACT ASSESSMENT:** Sustained U.S.-Iran exchanges and Iranian strikes on U.S. bases in Kuwait and Bahrain raise immediate upside pressure on crude benchmarks (Brent/WTI), Gulf risk premiums, tanker insurance costs, and defense equities. Higher safe-haven demand for gold and U.S. Treasuries is likely, while GCC equity markets and regional FX could come under pressure on fears of attacks migrating to energy export infrastructure and shipping lanes.